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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 05-2142
                    
                    









                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Crim. No. 03-00021-1)
Honorable Sue L. Robinson, District Judge
                    
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 6, 2006
BEFORE:  ROTH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, and
BUCKWALTER, District Judge*
(Filed: March 14, 2006)
                    
*Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for     
  the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before the court on an appeal by Tauchi Mitchell from a
conviction and sentence entered on April 5, 2005, on a single-count indictment charging
him with possession of ammunition while being a convicted felon in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).  After a jury convicted Mitchell, the district court
sentenced him to a 47-month custodial term to be followed by a 36-month term of
supervised release.  The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Mitchell, who is a convicted felon, raises three issues on this appeal:  (1) the
police’s original warrantless entry into the premises at 528 N. Monroe Street,
Wilmington, Delaware, at which Mitchell resided at the time of their entry, where they
later found the ammunition after they obtained a search warrant for the premises, was
unlawful as they did not have probable cause for the entry and there were no extant
exigent circumstances justifying it; (2) the subsequent search of the premises pursuant to
a search warrant during which the police found the ammunition was unlawful as the
justice of the peace issuing the warrant relied on illegally obtained evidence described in
the affidavit on which the warrant was predicated and the affiant executed the affidavit
with a reckless disregard of the truth of its assertions; (3) the justice of the peace issued
3the warrant on the basis of a false material assertion; and (4) the district court erred in not
admitting into evidence Mitchell’s uncle’s statement claiming possession of the
ammunition.  
The basic circumstances leading to the indictment and conviction are not in
dispute.  On October 1, 2002, Artese Williams found Lisa Ferguson who had been shot in
the 500 block of North Monroe Street in Wilmington, and took her to the Wilmington
Hospital.  Following the reporting of the incident, the police went to the area where
Williams indicated that she found Ferguson.  At that time and place, the police found a
drop of blood on the sidewalk and another drop of blood on the front steps of the
premises at 528 N. Monroe Street where Mitchell lived.  These discoveries led the police
to knock on the front door at 528 N. Monroe Street to ascertain if anyone inside had been
shot.  When the police knocked on the door, which apparently was not secured, it opened
and they saw blood inside the premises.  The premises, however, were empty of people. 
During this warrantless entry the police did not find any ammunition.  
Thereafter, on the basis of an affidavit in which, in some places, the affiant police
officer confused nearby North Madison Street with North Monroe Street, the police
obtained a search warrant for the North Monroe Street address to search for evidence
related to the shooting.  When executing the warrant they found ammunition in the
living/dining area and in Mitchell’s bedroom. 
Mitchell intended to call his uncle, Allen Fair, who also is a convicted felon, who
4previously resided at 528 N. Monroe Street, as a witness at the trial to establish that the
ammunition in the living/dining area may have been in Fair’s possession.  Fair, however,
invoked the privilege against self incrimination and thus did not testify.  Nevertheless,
Mitchell attempted to introduce Fair’s statement claiming possession of the ammunition
into evidence as a statement against Fair’s interest under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3).  The court rejected the proffer because, using an objective standard, the court
believed that the record did not establish that Fair knew that the statement was against his
interest and, in any event, the court believed that the statement was not corroborated.
We reject all of Mitchell’s arguments.  First, there is no doubt that the police had a
right and, indeed, a duty to go to the 500 block of North Monroe Street after receiving the
report of the shooting.  Then, when they saw blood on the sidewalk and on the front steps
at 528 N. Monroe Street, in view of their knowledge that there had been a shooting in the
area, they were justified if not compelled to enter the premises immediately as they had a
basis to believe that someone in the premises might be in imminent danger.  See
Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996).  After all, they were aware of where
Williams found Ferguson and that Ferguson had been shot, and it was logical for them to
be concerned that there could be more victims.  Moreover, the presence of blood on the
front steps gave the police probable cause to believe that there would be evidence of the
crime inside the premises, though this point is more significant with respect to the
securing of the warrant than the initial entry.  Of course, the police’s observation of the
5blood in the premises enhanced the basis for finding that there was probable cause to
believe that there would be evidence of the crime in the premises.  See Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).  
Second, even though the search warrant affidavit referred to a “blood trail” and the
police found only drops of blood, the somewhat expansive characterization of what they
found was not material because even the minimal amount of blood recovered pointed to
528 N. Monroe Street as the crime scene and thus supplied probable cause for issuing the
warrant.  See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000).  Third, the confusion
between Madison and Monroe Streets in the affidavit, when the affidavit is considered in
its entirety, does not undercut the reasonableness of the justice of the peace in issuing the
search warrant for 528 N. Monroe Street.  See United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1206
(3d Cir. 1993).
We believe that Mitchell’s strongest argument relates to the exclusion of Fair’s
statement.  But even this contention fails.  Under Rule 804(b)(3), Mitchell had the burden
to demonstrate that Fair’s statement was “so far contrary to [his] pecuniary or proprietary
interest or so tended to subject [him] to civil or criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable
person in [his] position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.” 
Here we are concerned with the penal prong of Rule 804(b)(3).  
Initially on this point we are satisfied that Fair did not know that he was making a
statement against his penal interest when he claimed possession of some of the
6ammunition involved in this case because he did not know that it was unlawful for him to
possess the ammunition.  That circumstance, however, does not complete our Rule
804(b)(3) inquiry for, as Mitchell emphasizes, the Rule 804(b)(3) standard is objective so
that Fair’s lack of knowledge that his possession of ammunition was illegal is not
controlling.  But use of the objective standard does not help Mitchell because the district
court did not believe that a reasonable person convicted of a felony would realize that he
could not possess ammunition lawfully.  We agree with the court’s conclusion in this
regard for, as it indicated, a court at a plea colloquy ordinarily does not warn a felon that
he cannot possess ammunition.  Rather, the courts advise convicted defendants that they
should not have weapons.  Furthermore, prosecutions of convicted felons for possession
solely of ammunition, such as that here, are unusual.  Finally we point out that in at least
some criminal judgments used in district courts the conditions of supervised release recite
that “[t]he defendant shall not possess a firearm, destructive device, or any other
dangerous weapon.”  While we do not know what the judgment in Fair’s case set forth we
note that in Mitchell’s case the judgment included this condition without mentioning
ammunition.
In reaching our conclusion we have not overlooked Mitchell’s argument that “any
assertion that [Fair] was unaware of the consequences of his statement would be
irrelevant in determining whether his statement was indictive of criminal culpability.” 
Appellant’s br. at 28.  Indeed, we accept that statement as correct.  The problem with the
1      In view of our conclusions we do not consider certain other bases that the government1
2 has advanced for upholding the rejection of Fair’s statement.
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argument, however, is that we are not concerned with the use of the statement in a
prosecution of Fair as his admission.  Instead, we are considering the statement’s use
under Rule 804(b)(3), which does not deal solely with what the law is but rather with the
mental state of a “reasonable person.”1
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of conviction and sentence entered April 5,
2005, will be affirmed.
